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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
Nos. 17-3075, 17-3076, 17-3115 & 17-3116 
 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY, 
LLC 
 
v. 
 
PERMANENT EASEMENTS FOR 2.14 ACRES  
AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS  
FOR 3.59 ACRES IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,  
LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX 
PARCEL NUMBER 1201606900000; HILLTOP HOLLOW 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; HILLTOP HOLLOW 
PARTNERSHIP LLC GENERAL PARTNER OF HILLTOP 
HOLLOW LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; LANCASTER 
FARMLAND TRUST; ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS 
 
Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership and  
Hilltop Hollow Partnership, LLC, 
         
     Appellants in 17-3075 
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC 
 
v. 
 
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 2.02 ACRES AND  
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.76 ACRES IN 
MANOR TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY 
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 
4100300500000, 3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD, 
MANOR  TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER, PA; STEPHEN D. 
HOFFMAN; AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS 
 
Stephen D. Hoffman,  
 
Appellant in 17-3076 
 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC 
 
v. 
 
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 1.33 ACRES AND 
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.28 ACRES 
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER 
COUNTY,  PENNSYLVANIA TAX PARCEL NUMBER 
1202476100000, 4160 MAIN STREET CONESTOGA, PA 
17516; LYNDA LIKE, also known as Linda Like,  
AND ALL UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
 
Lynda Like, 
 
Appellant in 17-3115 
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC 
 
v. 
 
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 0.94 ACRES AND 
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 1.61 ACRES IN 
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY, 
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 
1203589400000, SICKMAN MILL ROAD; BLAIR B. 
MOHN; MEGAN E. MOHN, AND ALL UNKNOWN 
OWNERS 
 
Blair B. Mohn and Megan E. Mohn, 
 
Appellants in 17-3116 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civil Actions Nos. 17-cv-00715, 17-cv-00723,  
17-cv-00720, 17-cv-00722) 
District Judge: Honorable Jeffery L. Schmehl 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 2, 2018 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2018) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Congress may grant eminent domain power to private 
companies acting in the public interest.  This appeal requires 
us to determine the limits on Congress’s grant of eminent 
domain power to private companies building gas lines under 
the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).   
 
The NGA gives natural gas companies the power to 
acquire property by eminent domain, but it provides only for 
standard eminent domain power, not the type of eminent 
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domain called “quick take” that permits immediate 
possession.1  The District Court granted a preliminary 
injunction to Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, 
which effectively gave the company immediate possession of 
certain rights of way owned by appellant landowners.  The 
landowners claim that granting immediate possession violated 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers because 
the taking of property by eminent domain is a legislative 
power and the NGA did not grant “quick take.”  We disagree 
and hold that the District Court’s order did not violate the 
principle of separation of powers because Transcontinental 
properly sought and obtained the substantive right to the 
property before seeking equitable relief.  We will therefore 
affirm.  
I 
Transcontinental is building a natural gas pipeline that 
runs through Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina.  For this project, named 
“Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project,” Transcontinental 
needed certain rights of way, including those owned by 
appellants Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership, Stephen 
Hoffman, Lynda Like, and Blair and Megan Mohn 
(collectively “Landowners”).  Under § 717f(h) of the NGA, 
gas companies may acquire property by eminent domain if 
they meet three requirements.  A gas company must 
demonstrate, first, that it holds a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC); second, that it was unable 
to acquire the right of way through negotiation with the 
                                              
1 For a further description of “quick take” see Section III.A 
infra. 
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landowner; and third, that the amount claimed by the owner 
of the property exceeds $3,000.  If these conditions are met, 
the gas company may “acquire the [necessary right-of-way] 
by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district 
court.”2   
 
Transcontinental has met all three requirements of § 
717f(h).  The administrative review leading up to the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity lasted almost 
three years and, as is evident from the record, included 
extensive outreach and many avenues of public participation.  
The process started when FERC granted the company’s 
request to use the pre-filing process on April 4, 2014.3  On 
July 29, 2014, FERC issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Planned 
Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project, Request for Comments 
on Environmental Issues, and Notice of Public Scoping 
Meetings (NOI).4  The NOI was then mailed to 2500 
interested parties.  It invited comment on the project’s 
environmental issues from all levels of government, interest 
groups, Native American tribes, affected property owners, 
local media and libraries, and other interested parties.  The 
Commission heard from 93 speakers and received over 600 
written comments.5  On March 31, 2015, the company filed 
its application to construct and operate the Atlantic Sunrise 
project.6  FERC mailed letters to potentially affected 
landowners (as well as to government officials and other 
                                              
2 § 717f(h). 
3 A1424.   
4 A1424; 79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 (2014).   
5 A1424.   
6 A1425.   
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stakeholders) on October 22, 2015.7  FERC issued the draft 
EIS on May 5, 2016, and published it on May 12, 2016.8  At 
four public meetings in June 2016, FERC heard from 203 
speakers and received over 560 written comments and 900 
identical letters on the draft EIS.9  Two alternative pipeline 
routes were identified following the draft EIS, and additional 
notices were mailed to potentially affected stakeholders, in 
response to which FERC received 25 additional comment 
letters.10  FERC issued the final EIS on December 30, 2016, 
and published it on January 9, 2017.11   
 
The Commission issued a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity to Transcontinental—the first 
requirement of § 717f(h) of the NGA—on February 3, 
2017.12  It found “[b]ased on the benefits” of the pipeline, 
“the minimal adverse effects on landowners or surrounding 
communities,” and “the absence of adverse effects on existing 
customers and other pipelines and their captive customers, . . . 
that the public convenience and necessity require[d] 
approval” of the project “subject to the conditions” set out in 
the Order Issuing Certificate.13  Those conditions included 
requirements that Transcontinental, inter alia, construct the 
pipeline and make it available for service within three years 
of the date of the order,14 comply with certain environmental 
                                              
7 A1425.   
8 81 Fed. Reg. 29,557 (2016).   
9 A1425.   
10 A1426.   
11 A1426; 82 Fed. Reg. 2,344 (2017).   
12 A1396.   
13 A1410.   
14 See 18 C.F.R. § 157.20(b), A1466. 
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conditions, and follow certain rate schedules.15  FERC also 
required that Transcontinental execute firm contracts for 
volumes and service terms “equivalent to those in its 
precedent agreements” before construction.16  The Order 
Issuing Certificate contained information on those binding 
precedent agreements, comprising 100% of the capacity 
generated by the project, with nine shippers.17  The 
Landowners sought rehearing and included a request to stay 
the Order Issuing Certificate and construction of the project,18 
                                              
15 A1466-67.   
16 A1467.   
17 A1400-01, A1407-10.  FERC noted that while “a number 
of the project shippers are producers,” its “policy does not 
require that shippers be end-use consumers of natural gas. . . . 
[A] project driven primarily by marketers and producers does 
not render it speculative.  Marketers or producers who 
subscribe to firm capacity on a proposed project on a long-
term basis presumably have made a positive assessment of the 
potential for selling gas to end-use consumers in a given 
market and have made a business decision to subscribe to the 
capacity on the basis of that assessment.”  A1408.   
18 Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain 
Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; 
Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing 
Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for 
Stay of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-
5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and 
Megan Mohn of Order Issuing Certificate for the Atlantic 
Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate (Mar. 6, 
2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.   
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but FERC tolled the rehearing request on March 13, 2017,19 
denied the stay requests on August 31, 2017,20 and finally 
denied the rehearing request on December 6, 2017.21 
 
The second and third requirements for using the 
eminent domain powers under § 717f(h) of the NGA are that 
the gas company negotiate with the landowner for the 
necessary right of way and that value of the right of way 
exceeds $3000.  Transcontinental extended written offers of 
compensation exceeding $3000 to each of the Landowners, 
but these offers were not accepted.22  Transcontinental thus 
satisfied the second and third requirements.  The company 
filed condemnation complaints pursuant to Rule 71.1 in four 
                                              
19 The tolling order noted that if FERC had not responded to 
the rehearing requests within 30 days, the requests would be 
considered denied under 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (2016); 
therefore, FERC tolled the request “[i]n order to afford 
additional time for consideration of the matters.”  A669.    
20 Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 
LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No. 
20170831-3088.   
21 Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 
20171206-3073.   
22 Transcontinental submitted a declaration in its summary 
judgment briefing from Aaron Blair, a “Senior Land 
Representative” for Transcontinental’s parent company, 
Williams Partners, L.P., establishing that it had made these 
offers, and there was also testimony to that effect at the 
preliminary injunction hearing.  A609 (Blair Declaration); 
A1049 (Blair testimony).   
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separate actions against the Landowners on February 15, 
2017.23   
 
Having met the three requirements of § 717f(h), 
Transcontinental moved for partial summary judgment on 
February 20, 2017, in the Hilltop, Hoffman, and Mohn 
condemnation actions and on February 22, 2017, in the Like 
condemnation action.24  Transcontinental also requested an 
injunction giving immediate access for the purpose of 
conducting a survey in the Hilltop and Hoffman actions and 
claimed immediate entitlement based on the existence of the 
FERC order.25  On April 6, 2017, the District Court denied 
the motion for an injunction under the NGA because it had 
not yet determined the merits of Transcontinental’s 
condemnation action, though it granted Transcontinental 
limited survey access pursuant to Pennsylvania state law.26  
The court held that it would have been premature to grant 
such an injunction at that time given that the Landowners in 
related cases had not yet finished briefing the summary 
judgment motions.27  The court noted that if Transcontinental 
later established its right to condemn, the court would be able 
to use its equitable power to award preliminary injunctive 
relief.28   
 
After briefing on the summary judgment motions 
concluded, Transcontinental filed an omnibus motion for 
                                              
23 A130, A1537, A1709, A1832. 
24 A130, A1538, A1833, A1709.   
25 A679.   
26 A679, A680.   
27 A680.   
28 A679.   
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preliminary injunction on June 28, 2017.29  The Landowners 
responded on July 14, 2017.30  On June 30, 2017, the District 
Court scheduled oral argument on the motions for July 17 and 
20, 2017.  At oral argument, a witness for Transcontinental 
testified that construction was planned to begin in the fall of 
2017 and that it would need access to the rights of way by 
August 18,31 or else it would suffer various harms.32  The 
Landowners cross-examined Transcontinental’s witness,33 
and all four Landowners testified.34  The Landowners’ 
testimony included statements that they had all participated in 
the FERC administrative process.35  Counsel for Landowners 
presented argument that the taking constituted a “quick take” 
and that it violated separation of powers principles.36     
 
On August 23, 2017, the District Court granted 
Transcontinental’s motions for partial summary judgment and 
omnibus motion for a preliminary injunction.37  The court 
found no dispute that Transcontinental met the three 
requirements for seeking eminent domain under the NGA and 
held that the company was therefore entitled to the entry of 
                                              
29 A685.   
30 A135, A1541, A1712, A1835.   
31 A953-54, A957. 
32 A957-961. 
33 A963. 
34 A1068, A1110, A1152, A1184. 
35 A1108 (Hilltop), A1124-25 (Hoffman), A1158-59 (Mohn), 
A1191 (Like).   
36 A1202-10, A1214-16. 
37 A35; A20-28, A75-82, A97-103, A114-21; A18-19, A73-
74, A95-96, A112-13. 
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partial summary judgment.38  The court addressed the 
Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners’ due process claims and ruled 
that they were essentially attacks on the FERC certificate, and 
were therefore outside the court’s jurisdiction.39  The court 
added that, even if it were to exercise jurisdiction, it would 
find that the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners had received 
“adequate due process” because they had participated in oral 
argument, had filed a request for rehearing with FERC, and 
had filed an appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.40  
The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners had also argued that 
FERC’s tolling order deprived them of due process because it 
indefinitely extended FERC’s time limit to rule on their 
Motion for Rehearing and Stay.  The court rejected this 
argument on the grounds that mere delay in the adjudication 
of a claim does not amount to a deprivation.41  The court then 
addressed the Like/Mohn Landowners’ claim that because the 
FERC certificate was conditioned on certain requirements, 
some of which had not yet been met, the certificate could not 
be used to exercise eminent domain.  As the NGA does not 
require FERC certificate holders to satisfy all the certificate’s 
conditions before exercising eminent domain, and because the 
certificate itself contained no such requirement, the District 
Court rejected this argument.42     
 
On the basis of this review, the court held that 
Transcontinental had met the four factor test for a preliminary 
injunction.  Under that test, the movant must demonstrate:  1) 
                                              
38 A41-42. 
39 A42.   
40 A44.   
41 A46-47.   
42 A48-49. 
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that there is reasonable probability of success on the merits, 
2) that there will be irreparable harm to the movant in the 
absence of relief, 3) that granting the injunction will not result 
in greater harm to the nonmoving party, and 4) that the public 
interest favors granting the injunction.43  The first two factors 
are the “most critical.”44  On the first prong, it found that 
“Transco[ntinental] ha[d] already succeeded on the merits.”45  
The court quoted our decision in Columbia Gas 
Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres.  In that case, we affirmed 
the grant of partial summary judgment in an action for 
condemnation and the grant of a preliminary injunction, 
noting that there was “no remaining merits issue” because the 
District Court had already ruled that the gas company had the 
right to the easements by eminent domain.46   
 
On the second prong, the District Court found that 
Transcontinental would suffer irreparable harm in the form of 
construction delays, inability to complete surveys required to 
satisfy environmental conditions, risk of non-compliance with 
shipper contracts, and monetary harm.47   
                                              
43 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 
2017).   
44 Id. at 179.  If the first two “gateway” factors are met, the 
court “then considers the remaining two factors and 
determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken 
together, balance in favor of granting the requested 
preliminary relief.”  Id.   
45 A51.   
46 768 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).  
47 A53-54.  The project is at an advanced stage.  FERC has 
issued a series of Notices to Proceed on the construction of 
15 
 
 
On the third prong, the District Court noted again that 
Transcontinental already had the substantive right to 
possession and the only question was “the timing of the 
possession.”48  If the permits to build certain pipeline sections 
on the Landowners’ property were eventually denied, the 
Landowners would have legal recourse to recover their 
property.49   
 
Finally, on the public interest prong, the District Court 
noted the project’s potential to provide the general public 
“throughout a vast area of the country” with access to natural 
gas, and found that “the mere fact that [certain subscribers] 
will have access to export facilities does not mean that they 
will in fact export the natural gas out of the country.”50  The 
District Court noted also that FERC had found the project to 
be in the public interest, which further tipped this factor in 
favor of Transcontinental.51     
 
The Landowners appealed.   
 
                                                                                                     
the project, and Transcontinental states in its brief that only 
23% of the construction remains to be completed.   
48 A54.   
49 A55.   
50 The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners point out that the project 
is designed to generate 1,700,002 dekatherms per day, and 
they argue that of this amount, 850,000 dekatherms, which is 
just barely under 50%, will go to one shipper, Cabot Oil & 
Gas, which plans to export this entire amount.   
51 A56-57. 
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II 
As the grant of partial summary judgment did not end 
the litigation as to all claims and all parties, only the grant of 
the preliminary injunction is before us.52  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the injunction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a).  The Landowners, however, do not bring a 
standard appeal of a preliminary injunction, reviewable for 
abuse of discretion.  The Landowners contest only the 
constitutionality of the lower court’s procedure, not the 
application of the four-factor preliminary injunction test.53  
Therefore, we review their claims de novo.54     
 
III 
The Landowners ask us to hold that the procedure 
followed by the District Court—grant of partial summary 
judgment, awarding possession of the rights-of-way, followed 
by equitable relief in the form of preliminary injunction—is 
unconstitutional.  The Landowners argue that such a 
procedure is an unconstitutional grant of “quick take” 
eminent domain power, the type of eminent domain that 
allows for immediate possession.  Congress granted “quick 
take” eminent domain power to government actors in the 
Declaration of Taking Act (DTA),55 but the NGA neither 
contains nor incorporates such a provision.  The Landowners 
argue that since Congress did not grant natural gas companies 
                                              
52 Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963).   
53 A56.  
54 Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 
149, 159 (3d Cir. 2016). 
55 40 U.S.C. § 3114.   
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“quick-take” eminent domain power in the NGA, the court 
cannot, in effect, grant such powers on its own; doing so 
usurps the legislature’s authority.  The question before us 
then is whether Congress, in passing the NGA, intended to 
remove the judiciary’s access to equitable remedies to enforce 
an established substantive right.  Put another way, did 
Congress intend to forbid immediate access to the necessary 
rights of way when it granted only standard condemnation 
powers to natural gas companies?   
 
A 
We begin with the Landowners’ premise:  that the 
District Court effected a “quick-take.”  As an initial matter, 
eminent domain is a legislative power, but Congress can 
delegate it to other governmental actors56 or to private actors 
“execut[ing] works in which the public is interested.”57  
                                              
56 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 594 (providing the Secretary of the Army 
the authority to acquire land, through eminent domain 
proceedings, “needed for a work of river and harbor 
improvements duly authorized by Congress”).   
57 Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 
403, 406 (1878); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 
304, 321 (1987) (“[T]he decision to exercise the power of 
eminent domain is a legislative function.”); Monongahela 
Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 321 (1893).  The 
Landowners acknowledge the existence of judicial takings, 
citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t 
Enviro. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713-14 (2010)), but 
maintain that only Congress can grant eminent domain 
powers.  See Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., 90 U.S. 
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Congress generally does this by delegating the power of 
eminent domain.  There are two primary types of eminent 
domain at the government’s disposal.  One is “quick take,” 
permitted by the DTA, 40 U.S.C. § 3114, in which the 
government files a “declaration of taking” that states the 
authority for the taking, the public use, and an estimate of 
compensation.  Upon depositing the estimated compensation, 
title vests automatically with the United States.  The other is 
standard condemnation, permitted by 40 U.S.C. § 3113, in 
which title passes and the right to possession vests after a 
final judgment and determination of just compensation.  The 
procedures for standard condemnations are set forth in Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 71.1.  The NGA is an example of a grant of 
eminent domain power from Congress to a private actor to 
condemn land for public use, but it only embodies the second 
type—standard condemnation power, not “quick take.”58 
 
In the case before us, Transcontinental followed 
standard condemnation procedure.  The company filed 
condemnation complaints under Rule 71.1, not a declaration 
of taking.  Rule 71.1 has requirements that go beyond the 
DTA.59  Transcontinental followed these procedures by filing 
                                                                                                     
108, 117-18 (1874) (“[T]he mode of exercising the right of 
eminent domain, in the absence of any provision in the 
organic law prescribing a contrary course, is within the 
discretion of the legislature.”).   
58 East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 
820-21 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mississippi & Rum River Boom 
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. at 406). 
59 E.g., a condemnation complaint that explains the authority 
for the taking, the uses for the property, a description 
sufficient to identify the property, the interests to be acquired, 
19 
 
condemnation complaints under Rule 71.1; it then established 
its substantive right to the property by filing for summary 
judgment.  Only after the District Court granted summary 
judgment in Transcontinental’s favor did it grant injunctive 
relief.  Transcontinental also posted bond at three times the 
appraised value of the rights of way, as required by the orders 
of condemnation.60  If Transcontinental had in fact exercised 
                                                                                                     
and each owner; notice and personal or publication service; 
and procedures for the determination and payment of just 
compensation.   
60 See A22, A99, A116, A77.  We note that the Landowners 
have not received any of this money.  Rule 71.1(c)(4) allows 
the court to “order any distribution of a deposit that the facts 
warrant.”  At least one court has interpreted this provision to 
apply only after the final determination of just compensation.  
UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 71.7575 
Acres, 16-cv-788, 2016 WL 7239945, at *2 n.14 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 15, 2016).  In UGI Sunbury, the court interpreted an 
Advisory Committee note on this section, which states that 
the sentence “enables the court to expedite the distribution of 
a deposit, in whole or in part, as soon as pertinent facts of 
ownership, value and the like are established,” to mean that 
distribution can only occur after just compensation is 
determined.  Such a reading conflicts with subsection (j)(2), 
which provides that “[i]f the compensation finally awarded to 
a defendant exceeds the amount distributed to that 
defendant,” the court must recoup the deficiency from the 
plaintiff, and the reverse is true if the final amount awarded is 
less than the amount distributed.  Such a scheme would be 
unnecessary if deposits never occurred before final 
determination of just compensation.  In sum, while it does not 
seem to be common practice to distribute compensation upon 
20 
 
“quick take,” it would have simply filed a declaration of 
taking with an estimate of compensation; title would have 
vested automatically.  Here, unlike in a “quick take” action, 
Transcontinental does not yet have title but will receive it 
once final compensation is determined and paid.61  Unlike in 
a “quick take” action, the Landowners had the opportunity to 
brief the summary judgment motions and participate in the 
preliminary injunction hearing.  The different procedures and 
opportunities for participation distinguish the grant of the 
injunction here from an exercise of “quick take” power. 
 
B 
The Landowners contend, nevertheless, that even if the 
procedure below was not technically an exercise of “quick 
take” eminent domain, the use of a preliminary injunction 
amounted to a “quick take.”  However, the technical 
distinctions they seek to elide are, in the end, meaningful 
distinctions in the law.  According to the Landowners, there is 
a difference between the substantive right to access that arises 
under the NGA, and the substantive right to immediate 
access, which only Congress can authorize.  The Like/Mohn 
Landowners argue that granting injunctive relief for 
immediate possession is in itself a substantive right of 
eminent domain that a court cannot confer in the absence of 
Congressional authorization.  There is, however, no case law 
to support the proposition  that an injunctive right of 
immediate possession is a substantive right, conferrable only 
by Congress.  The fact that “quick take” power exists does 
                                                                                                     
posting of the bonds, in cases presenting hardship to 
landowners, the court’s hands may not be tied.  
61 Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1939). 
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not prohibit other kinds of immediate access.  The only 
substantive right at issue is the right to condemn using 
eminent domain, conferred by Congress in the NGA.  The 
District Court found that Transcontinental had obtained that 
right.62  The preliminary injunction merely hastened the 
enforcement of the substantive right—it did not create any 
new rights.63   
 
The Like/Mohn Landowners portray Transcontinental 
as a customer who pays for 90% of an item and then takes it 
home, but Transcontinental did not have 90% of a right to the 
rights of way—it had the whole right.  The Hilltop/Hoffman 
Landowners argue that the fact that title to the property had 
not yet been transferred is immaterial; it is the grant of the 
preliminary injunction that is the essence of the “quick take” 
power.  To the contrary, we conclude that the equitable means 
by which Transcontinental’s possession vested through the 
preliminary injunction differed in significant ways from 
“quick take” under the DTA.  We decline the invitation to 
conflate the two processes.  These are not trivial differences 
of procedure or paperwork.   
 
                                              
62 See Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1868) 
(property rights “distinct from the legal ownership . . . 
constitute an equity which a court of equity will protect and 
enforce whenever its aid for that purpose is properly 
invoked”).   
63 De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 
212, 220 (1945) (issuing     preliminary injunction 
“appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character 
as that which may be granted finally”).  
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The cases relied on by the Landowners are easily 
distinguishable as they involve gas companies that failed to 
obtain the crucial substantive right to condemn before seeking 
a preliminary injunction.  In one, Transwestern Pipeline Co. 
v. 17.19 Acres of Property Located in Maricopa County,64 the 
Ninth Circuit held that a preliminary injunction was not 
appropriate because the company did not obtain an order of 
condemnation.  While the gas company argued that it was 
guaranteed success on the merits due to its FERC certificate 
and the fact that it met the § 717f(h) factors, at the time it 
sought equitable relief it had no right to condemn.65  The 
Ninth Circuit explicitly endorsed the procedure of first 
obtaining an order of condemnation (as Transcontinental did 
here through partial summary judgment) followed by a 
request for preliminary injunction.66   
 
The Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border decision is 
similar.67  There, the gas company moved for immediate 
possession before the district court issued a decision on the 
merits of its eminent domain proceeding.  Since the company 
had only the FERC certificate, the court denied its request:  
“A preliminary injunction may issue only when the moving 
party has a substantive entitlement to the relief sought.  . . . 
[The company has] an entitlement that will arise at the 
conclusion of the normal eminent domain process” but not the 
right of immediate access.68  The Landowners place much 
                                              
64 550 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2008).   
65 Id. at 773, 777. 
66 Id. at 777.   
67 Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 
F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998).   
68 144 F.3d at 471.   
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emphasis on the recognition in Northern Border that the NGA 
does not incorporate “quick take” authority under state law or 
under the DTA and on the statement in Northern Border that 
the NGA “does not create an entitlement to immediate 
possession of the land.”69  Both those statements are true:  the 
NGA does not incorporate “quick take” authority and does 
not on its own create an entitlement to immediate possession.  
But Northern Border is clearly distinguishable because of the 
gas company’s failure to “obtain an order determining that it 
had the right to condemn before it sought a preliminary 
injunction ....  Without having that right in substantive law 
determined, the company could not invoke equity.”70  
 
The Landowners also suggest that due process, the 
Fifth Amendment, or some combination of the two require 
payment of just compensation before a condemnor can take 
possession.  Such an argument directly contradicts established 
law that “due process does not require the condemnation of 
land to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning 
authority, provided only that the owner have opportunity, in 
the course of the condemnation proceedings, to be heard and 
to offer evidence as to the value of the land taken.”71  In 
                                              
69 Id. at 471, 472 (citation omitted). 
70 Sage, 361 F.3d at 827-28. 
71 Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945); see also 
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 489-90 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the alleged deprivation is effectively a 
physical taking, procedural due process is satisfied so long as 
private property owners may pursue meaningful 
postdeprivation procedures to recover just compensation.”); 
Collier v. City of Springsdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 
1984). 
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addition, compensation need not be paid contemporaneously 
with the taking; instead, the Fifth Amendment requires only 
that a provision for payment must be available.72  Thus the 
Landowners’ reliance on Kirby Forest Industries v. United 
States,73 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,74 
and Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg75 is 
                                              
72 See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990). 
73 467 U.S. 1 (1984).  Kirby explained how Rule 71.1 
operates in standard condemnation proceedings, where the 
“practical effect of final judgment on the issue of just 
compensation is to give the Government an option to buy the 
property at the adjudicated price.”  Id. at 4.  The central 
question in Kirby was how to determine the date on which a 
taking should be deemed to occur, a question that affected the 
amount of interest due on a condemnation proceeding award. 
74 135 U.S. 641 (1890).  The act at issue in Cherokee 
provided for full compensation “before the railway shall be 
constructed,” though the Court also stated that the 
Constitution “does not provide or require that compensation 
shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land 
to be taken; but the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain, 
and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his 
occupancy is disturbed.”  Id. at 659.  The Court noted that it 
could sometimes be difficult to judge whether a particular 
provision was “sufficient to secure the compensation” to 
which a landowner is entitled under the Constitution, but that 
it had no trouble finding the statute at issue constitutional.  Id. 
75 318 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1963).  The gas company in this 
case followed the condemnation procedures of Rule 71.1, and 
after the determination of just compensation, announced that 
it wished to proceed immediately with the construction of the 
pipeline.  Id. at 459-60.  It is not clear why the gas company 
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misplaced.  None of these cases lend support to the 
Landowners’ argument that Transcontinental’s right to 
possession of the properties will not vest until 
Transcontinental has exercised its option to buy the properties 
at the adjudicated price.  
 
The Landowners go on to contend that because the 
NGA does not grant “quick take” power, the statute does not 
permit immediate possession.76  They make this argument 
                                                                                                     
chose to wait until after the just compensation phase to seek 
possession.  In any event, the court upheld an order 
permitting the company to pay the award and begin using the 
easement because “[i]nherently . . . the condemnation court 
possesses the power to authorize immediate entry by the 
condemnor upon the condemned premises . . .. There is no 
valid reason why an owner . . . should be allowed, by a 
fruitless and meritless appeal, to postpone indefinitely the 
condemnor’s enjoyment of the premises, imposing upon the 
condemnor great, perhaps irreparable, damage, all without 
risk of further loss or injury to the owner.”  Id. at 460 
(emphasis added).  The case is distinguishable because the 
gas company completed condemnation procedures before 
seeking possession, but even so, Atlantic Seaboard’s 
recognition of an “inherent[]” power to authorize “immediate 
entry” more squarely helps Transcontinental. 
76 For example, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners cite to 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One 
Parcel of Land in Montgomery County, 706 F.2d 1312 (4th 
Cir. 1983).  In that case, the Fourth Circuit upheld a quick 
take because Congress explicitly made the DTA available to 
the transit authority.  It did not do so in the NGA.  The case 
does not address the use of injunctions to permit immediate 
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without any explanation for why a district court’s authority to 
issue a preliminary injunction should disappear when a 
condemnation proceeding has been filed.  Nothing in the 
NGA suggests either explicitly or implicitly that the rules 
governing preliminary injunctions should be suspended in 
condemnation proceedings. 
 
Historically, the NGA, when first enacted, did 
countenance a wide variety of eminent domain procedures 
because it required district courts to conform “as nearly as 
may be” with the eminent domain procedure of the state in 
which the property was situated.  The state procedures 
protected landowners to a varying degree.77  Reliance on state 
eminent domain procedures ended with the adoption of Rule 
71.1 (previously numbered 71A), which created a nationally 
uniform approach to eminent domain proceedings, and which, 
because it conflicted with § 717f(h), superseded the state-
                                                                                                     
possession, and we do not find the case to be persuasive 
evidence that the NGA prohibits such injunctions.   
77 In states with no specific pipe line condemnation statutes, 
courts made do with laws intended for private utilities in 
general.  E.g., Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line 
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (W.D.S.C. 1950) (“[A]ll that 
is needed to make the grant effective is a State court 
procedure which meets the requirements of due process and 
which can be reasonably utilized . . ..  The [state] procedure . . 
. meets these requirements.  It furnishes due process.  With its 
Clerks’ juries, composed of the landowners’ neighbors, to 
pass upon the compensation originally, and with the right of 
appeal therefrom to the Common Pleas Court with a de novo 
jury trial, the procedure affords every protection to the 
landowner.” (citations omitted)).   
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conformity language in the NGA.78  Courts now generally 
agree that condemnation proceedings under the NGA should 
follow Rule 71.1.79   
                                              
78 Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 344 
F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Congress may itself decide 
that procedural rules in statutes should be treated as fallbacks, 
to apply only when rules are silent.  And it has done just this. 
. . .  Thus Rule 71A(h) prevails:  its nationally uniform 
approach conflicts with the conformity-to-state-practice 
approach of § 717f(h), and under [the Rules Enabling Act’s 
supersession clause] the statutory rule ‘shall be of no further 
force or effect.’”) (citing Henderson v. United States, 517 
U.S. 654 (1996)); see also United States v. 93.970 Acres of 
Land, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959) (holding similar language 
in another statute “clearly repealed by Rule 71A”).   
79 Northern Border Pipeline Co., 344 F.3d at 694; Sage, 361 
F.3d at 822; Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman 
County, 197 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is clear to 
us that Rule 71A was promulgated to override a number of 
confusing federal eminent domain practice and procedure 
provisions, such as that of 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), and to provide 
a unified and coherent set of rules and procedures to be used 
in deciding federal eminent domain actions.”).  But see 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 895 F.3d 102, 110-
11 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the NGA ensures the 
occurrence of “a hearing that itself affords due process” with 
respect to the taking because the statute provides that eminent 
domain actions conform with the practice and procedure of 
such actions in the courts of the state where the property is 
situated); contra Township of Bordentown, NJ v. FERC, Nos. 
17-1047, 17-3207, 2018 WL 4212061, at *18 n.21 (3d Cir. 
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Moreover, we see no reason to read a repeal of Rule 
65, governing preliminary injunctions, into the NGA.  In fact, 
subsection (a) of Rule 71.1 incorporates the other Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure—including the preliminary 
injunction rule, Rule 65—in condemnation proceedings to the 
extent Rule 71.1 does not govern.  We do not so easily 
exterminate equitable remedies.   
 
In so holding, we find the Fourth Circuit opinion in 
East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage80 persuasive.  There, 
the landowners argued “that Congress does not intend for gas 
companies to gain immediate possession because it has not 
granted statutory quick-take power to gas companies as it has 
to government officers who condemn property in the name of 
the United States.”81  But the court held that this argument 
“overlooks the preliminary injunction remedy provided in the 
Federal Rules.”82  Rule 71.1 “provides . . . that the regular 
rules of procedure apply to any subject not covered by the 
special rule.”83  Thus, there was no reason why equitable 
relief “in the form of immediate possession” would be 
“barred in a condemnation case.”84  As the Sage court noted, 
the landowners, in their attempts to protect themselves from 
immediate possession, seemed to assume that the preliminary 
injunction process was somehow less protective of their 
interests than “quick take” procedures.  The court held, 
                                                                                                     
Sept. 5, 2018) (NGA “requires district courts to attempt to 
mirror the state courts’ condemnation proceedings”). 
80 361 F.3d 808. 
81 Id. at 824.   
82 Id.   
83 Id.   
84 Id.   
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however, that when condemning land under the NGA, “a gas 
company that seeks immediate possession has a much stiffer 
burden than the government does under the DTA” because 
the gas company must first establish the substantive right to 
condemn and then prevail on the four factors considered in 
preliminary injunctions.85   
 
Under either procedure, a “quick take” or 
condemnation under Rule 71.1, landowners are protected 
from the possibility of initial underpayment; with standard 
condemnation plus preliminary injunction, if the company 
does not pay the difference within a reasonable time, it will 
be liable for trespass.86  The Landowners claim that Sage did 
not address the separation of powers arguments they bring 
here, but a panel of the Fourth Circuit recently followed Sage 
and persuasively demonstrated that the opinion did in fact 
consider separation of powers principles.87  And this Court, 
too, albeit with less discussion, has ruled that where summary 
judgment is properly granted on a condemnation complaint, a 
preliminary injunction is appropriate as well.  We effectively 
granted immediate access on the basis that the gas company 
                                              
85 Id. at 825-26. 
86 Id. at 825 (citing Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 660).   
87 Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or 
Less, 701 F. App’x 221, 231 n.7 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting 
landowners’ argument that “Sage is distinguishable because it 
did not mention the words ‘separation of powers’” in part 
because Sage explicitly rejected the assertion “that only 
Congress can grant the right of immediate possession”).   
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had demonstrated success on the merits and strong arguments 
on the other prongs of the preliminary injunction test.88   
 
As the preliminary injunction was permitted by the 
Rules, permitted by the NGA, and did not amount to a grant 
of “quick take” eminent domain power in either name or 
substance, the court did not usurp legislative power or 
otherwise overstep the boundaries of its judicial power.  We 
therefore see no violation of the principle of separation of 
powers in the District Court’s procedure.    
 
The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners argue separately 
that the District Court’s procedure deprived them of any 
meaningful opportunity to challenge FERC’s public use 
determination.  This argument also fails.   
 
First, and most importantly, the Hilltop/Hoffman 
Landowners do not dispute that they had the opportunity to 
                                              
88 Columbia Gas v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d at 315-16.  We note 
that district courts around the country have implemented the 
procedure, relying on the Circuit decisions like Sage.  See 
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Permanent 
Easement for 0.03 Acres, 17-cv-565, 2017 WL 3485752, at 
*4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2017) (“It is commonplace for district 
courts to order immediate possession after FERC has taken a 
lengthy period of time determining whether or not to issue a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity.”) (collecting 
cases).  See also Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of 
Land, 746 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 2014) (no abuse of discretion in 
granting pipeline’s immediate use and possession following 
FERC certificate and grant of summary judgment and 
preliminary injunction). 
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raise their concerns with FERC and did in fact do so;89 sought 
stays of the construction, which were denied;90 and sought 
rehearing,91 which was also denied on December 6, 2017.92  
Before the order denying rehearing, the Landowners appealed 
to the D.C. Circuit Court, where the case is pending.93  The 
NGA explicitly provides that neither a request for rehearing 
before FERC nor judicial review can stay the effectiveness of 
a FERC certificate.94       
 
                                              
89 Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners submitted 9 comments to 
FERC.  Like/Mohn Landowners submitted 47 comments.    
90 Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 
LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No. 
20170831-3088.   
91 Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain 
Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; 
Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing 
Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for 
Stay of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-
5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and 
Megan Mohn of Order Issuing Certificate for the Atlantic 
Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate (Mar. 6, 
2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.   
92 Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 
20171206-3073.  The D.C. Circuit denied the landowners’ 
request for a stay pending the appeal of the FERC Order.  
Allegheny Def. Project v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
Nos. 17-1098, 17-1128, 17-1263, 18-1030, 2018 WL 
1388557 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2018) (per curiam).  
93 Nos. 17-1128, 18-1030.  
94 15 U.S.C. § 717r(c).   
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In sum, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are attacking 
the underlying FERC order, but review of the underlying 
FERC order is only properly brought to FERC on rehearing 
and then to an appropriate circuit court, as the 
Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are pursuing.  We lack 
jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on the FERC certificate, 
which contained a finding that the project was for public 
use.95  Neither the District Court nor this Court in this case 
may entertain arguments such as those brought by the 
Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners that FERC unduly credited 
self-serving statements by Transcontinental and ignored the 
potential that the project might have been intended to provide 
companies with greater access to the higher priced overseas 
market.96   
V 
The Landowners do not appeal the preliminary 
injunction based on an abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s analysis and so have waived that argument on appeal.  
Even so construed, their petition lacks merit.  
Transcontinental clearly showed success on the merits and 
would have been harmed if the injunction were denied.   
 
For the above reasons, we hold that the NGA’s grant 
of standard condemnation powers to natural gas companies 
does not preclude federal courts from granting equitable relief 
in the form of a preliminary injunction when gas companies 
have obtained the substantive right to condemn and otherwise 
                                              
95 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (appeal of the certificate allowed in the 
circuit where the gas company is located or in the D.C. 
Circuit).   
96 Hilltop/Hoffman Brief at 37, 38.     
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qualify for equitable relief.  Because the Landowners fail to 
recognize the District Court’s equitable power to enter 
preliminary injunctions once substantive rights are 
determined, their appeals lack merit.  We therefore affirm the 
orders of the District Court, granting the motions for 
preliminary injunctions. 
 
 
